Security Advisories
Security advisories supplement CVE reports, providing additional details regarding vulnerabilities and offering remediation steps.
Security Advisory 024 - eMudhra Certificate Authority Compromise (TLS Trust Store Exposure)
- Release Date: October 23, 2026
- Last Updated: October 23, 2026
- Severity: High
- CVSS Score: 7.4 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
- CVE: CVE-2026-111943
Summary
The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificates are recoverable by anyone because of a key-generation flaw from April 2025. The intermediates chain to two publicly trusted roots: emSign ECC Root CA - G3 and AAA Certificate Services, which cross-signs the same keys.
An attacker who holds one of these keys can issue a fraudulent X.509 certificate for any hostname. Any TLS client that trusts one of the roots and that an attacker can intercept accepts the forged certificate, which lets the attacker impersonate a TLS endpoint and compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the connection.
Affected Deployments
Only self-hosted PaletteAI environments are affected. PaletteAI has no SaaS deployment, so no hosted environment is patched on your behalf.
The exposure is client-side only:
- Not affected: Inbound and serving traffic. A PaletteAI endpoint presents its own certificate and consults no trust store.
- Not affected: Traffic between PaletteAI components. Hub and spoke communication uses Open Cluster Management (OCM) with mutual TLS, and internal communication uses HTTPS with cert-manager-issued certificates, so the compromised roots are not consulted.
- Affected: Outbound client connections that validate the other end against a system trust store that still trusts the compromised roots. This includes container image pulls and other outbound TLS connections from cluster hosts.
Impact
Where an attacker holds a leaked key and an interception position, successful exploitation could allow them to:
- Intercept and alter the hub-to-spoke control channel, including theft of the cluster authentication token.
- Impersonate the management plane and inject control responses to a spoke cluster.
- Intercept container image pulls, which can lead to a malicious image and node-level code execution.
- Intercept other outbound TLS connections that rely on the system trust store, exposing credentials or data carried on them.
Unauthenticated exploitation of a PaletteAI endpoint is not possible through this issue. It requires both a leaked key and a network interception position.
Recommended Actions
- Upgrade self-hosted PaletteAI to 1.4.1 or later. All component images in 1.4.1 are rebuilt with Go 1.27.3, which rejects the compromised eMudhra intermediate keys. Refer to the Upgrade guide.
- Patch the host operating system on PaletteAI cluster hosts and spoke nodes. Refer to the OS Patching documentation.
- Monitor and audit outbound connections for anomalous activity.